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A Perspective: New York Communities
and Impact Fees
Bernard V. Keenan*
The New York Court of Appeals recently considered the
legal authority of New York communities to enact impact fee
legislation. The relevant judicial decisions' indicate that municipalities are authorized to adopt impact fee laws pursuant
to home rule power unless state legislation preempts the subject matter of the local impact fees. Widespread adoption of
impact fee laws by New York communities will likely trigger
review of numerous legal issues previously considered in other
jurisdictions. The following commentary focuses upon some of
those issues so that New York communities may benefit from
the experience of other municipalities and states.
I.

Introduction

Attorneys and land developers are generally familiar with
* Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School, B.A., 1970, College of the
Holy Cross, J.D., 1973, Georgetown University Law Center, LL.M., 1981, Columbia
University School of Law. Chairman, Subcommittee on Land Use Exactions and Impact Fees, The American Bar Association.
1. The New York Court of Appeals decision in Kamhi v. Town of Yorktown, 74
N.Y.2d 423, 547 N.E.2d 346, 548 N.Y.S.2d 144 (1989) invalidated a law conditioning
site plan approval upon the provision of park land or its monetary equivalent. The
opinion indicates that New York's Municipal Home Rule Law provides a sufficient
"power base" for the enactment of impact fee laws. However, the local legislation was
invalidated because it was not adopted in accordance with the procedural requirements of the State's Municipal Home Rule Law.
In Albany Area Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 546
N.E.2d 920, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627 (1989), the New York Court of Appeals determined
that existing state statutes preempted a local road improvement impact fee ordinance. The court noted that "[t]he purpose, number and specificity of these statutes
make clear that the State perceived no real distinction between the particular needs
of any one locality and other parts of the State ... and thus created a uniform
scheme to regulate this subject matter." Id. at 378-79, 546 N.E.2d at 923, 547
N.Y.S.2d at 630.
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the concept of traditional subdivision exactions whereby a developer is required by a community to set aside or dedicate
certain land within a proposed subdivision to be used for
streets, sidewalks, or recreational purposes. A developer is
often required to construct these improvements in conformity
with local standards.2 The dedication of land and the need to
construct streets and sidewalks is necessitated by the creation
of the subdivision. The exaction obviously burdens the developer; however, this financial burden is directly related to the
financial benefit derived by the sale of the developed property. Reasonable municipal land use exactions that affect land
located within a subdivision represent a legitimate exercise of
a community's police power.'
The "in-lieu fee" is another form of exaction arising
under subdivision regulation. A small subdivision may not
have sufficient land to set aside for recreational use and a municipality might be concerned about its legal authority to
"pass on" the cost of acquiring land for park or recreational
use. In this instance, a community may consider the imposition of a "fee in-lieu of dedication."' The municipality will
likely assert that it could lawfully require the "set aside" of
certain property within the subdivision if the subdivision were
larger. Correspondingly, a fee in-lieu of dedication may lawfully be imposed upon the developer of a smaller subdivision.
2. "By 1958, the mandatory construction of subdivision improvements as a condition of subdivision plat approval had become the dominant method of securing
such improvements. In that year, a survey . . . of 880 cities with populations over
10,000 revealed that 692 of the cities surveyed had subdivision regulations. Six hundred [and] fifteen of those cities imposing regulations required the subdivider to install one or more types of physical improvements in the subdivisions they were platting." Smith, From Subdivision Improvement Requirements to Community Benefit
Assessments and Linkage Payments: A Brief History of Land Development Exactions, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 5, 6 (Winter 1987).
3. "In a short period of time, [beginning in the early 1950's] numerous courts
sustained requirements for the construction of various public improvements on subdivision rights of way such as sewers, watermains, sidewalks, curbs and gutters, storm
drains, and even landscaping." Id. at 7.
4. D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT
CONTROL LAW

277 (2d ed. 1986).

5. E.g., Jordan v. Village of Menomonee Falls, 28 Wis. 2d 608, 137 N.W.2d 442
(1965), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 4 (1966).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol7/iss2/4

2

1990]

NEW YORK COMMUNITIES

This fee, combined with similar fees exacted from other developers, enables the municipality to purchase the land needed
for park purposes. This practice is generally accepted when
the regulation provides that the fee will be used to address a
municipal need occasioned by the development. No proof is
needed to show that the owners of the subdivision lots will
derive a benefit from the property purchased with the in-lieu
fees."
Various communities across the nation are experiencing
fast growth and a concomitant need to provide increased public services while attempting to maintain existing public facilities. Property owners are distressed when their tax rates soar
in order to provide services to newly developed properties.
The traditional practice of imposing narrowly-defined subdivision exactions and in-lieu fees cannot relieve the financial
drain resulting from fast growth, municipal infrastructure deficiencies, and the enactment of restrictive fiscal measures
such as California's Proposition 13. An increasing number of
communities view the imposition of "impact fees" as a means
or method of addressing these problems. Impact fees have
been defined as "single payments required to be made by
builders or developers at the time of development approval
and calculated to be the proportionate share of the cost of
providing trunk facilities (arterial roads, interceptor sewers,
sewage treatment plants, regional parks, etc.) to [the] development."' 7 Impact fee assessments should be directed toward
satisfying the cost of municipal capital improvements necessitated by private construction projects. Moreover, municipalities favor the concept of impact fees because the fees may be
imposed upon a wide array of development efforts including
condominium, commercial, industrial, and institutional
projects, as well as residential subdivisions.'
6. See Jenad, Inc. v. Village of Scarsdale, 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271
N.Y.S.2d 955 (1966). The Jenad decision is discussed infra at notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
7. Weschler, Mushkatel & Frank, Politics and Administration of Development
Exactions, in DEVELOPMENT EXACTIONS 19 (J. Frank & R. Rhodes eds. 1987) [hereinafter Weschler.
8. The fact that impact fees may be imposed upon varied types of land develop-
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An impact fee is usually paid when a building permit is
issued and the amount of the fee is often calculated by formulae based upon such factors as the gross floor area of a structure or the number of bedrooms in a residence.' An impact fee
may be extremely costly and the imposition of the fee may
result in a broad legal challenge or merely a dispute concerning the amount of the fee. 10
Some confusion understandably arises when the terms
"linkage fees" and "impact fees" are used interchangeably.
Linkage programs generally deal with issues far different from
municipal infrastructure concerns. A linkage regulation may
address certain social concerns by establishing a link between
proposed development and the need for a developer to contribute funds to support the desired societal goal. For example, the City of Boston's linkage ordinance exacts monetary
payments from developers to assist in providing housing opportunities for financially disadvantaged families.1
II.

Statistical Information Concerning Impact Fees

National surveys, although limited in number and
scope,"2 present certain information relative to the frequency
ment is typified by a Florida county's ordinance requiring that impact fee payments
be triggered by residential, commercial, and industrial land uses. ST. JOHNS COUNTY,
FLA., PUBLIC CAPrrAL FACILITIES IMPACT FEE ORDINANCE 87-59, § 7 (1987).
9. Bauman & Ethier, Development Exactions and Impact Fees: A Survey of
American Practices, 50 LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS., 51, 56 (Winter 1987).
10. See, e.g., Frisella v. Town of Farmington, 131 N.H. 78, 550 A.2d 102 (1988)
(invalidating a planning board requirement that a developer pay the cost of improving a portion of roadway not located adjacent to the developer's property though the
developer did not object to assuming the cost of improving the adjacent portion of
roadway).
11. BOSTON, MASS., ZONING CODE art. 26A (1983), as amended by BOSTON, MASS.,
ZONING CODE art. 26A (1986). Pursuant to the provisions of Boston's linkage ordinance, a payment of $6.00 per square foot is imposed upon developers of new or renovated structures occupied by retail, business, institutional, and hotel/motel uses. The
fee is based on each square foot of construction exceeding 100,000 square feet and the
ordinance applies only to projects requiring some form of zoning relief (e.g., zoning
map or text amendment, variance, or conditional use permit). Id. art. 26A, §§ 2(1), 3.
12. "National" surveys are limited to studies of park, sewer, and fire facility impact fees. Broader surveys of development and impact fees have been conducted in
limited geographic areas such as Florida cities and counties as well as communities
within the San Francisco Bay Area. Weschler, supra note 7, at 23.
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of impact fee enactment. Statistics indicate that California
has the largest number of communities adopting impact fee
laws. Other states with a significant number of local impact
fee enactments are Florida, Washington, Oregon, Colorado,
and Texas."3
It seems predictable that impact fee programs would be
popular in fast-growth states because impact fees are imposed
upon new construction. The surveys also indicate that a number of impact fee ordinances have been enacted in slowgrowth states. However, the data ultimately reveal a consistent pattern because these impact fee laws were adopted in
growing municipalities located within the slow-growth states.1"
The most consistent data regarding impact fee costs relate to sewer and water impact fees. Average sewer impact
fees are approximately $700 per single-family, detached dwelling and water impact fees amount to $525 per residential
unit.16 Some impact fee charges far exceed these amounts,
with one reported sewer impact fee of approximately $6,000.16
The average total impact fee payment in San Diego, California amounts to $9,500 per dwelling unit.
Another survey estimates that 41.2% of cities and counties do not require developers to contribute cash payments for
any type of capital facility. i s The most common explanations
13. The national fire facility, park, and sewer impact fee surveys indicate that
seventy-three California communities have adopted impact fee legislation relating to
one or more of the subject areas. In comparison, nine Texas municipalities have enacted such laws. Weschler, supra note 7, at 26.
The findings of the three national surveys were published in 1983 and 1985. It is
probable that a more recent survey would reveal increased enactment of impact fee
laws in numerous municipalities.
14. Id. at 25.
15. Id. at 24.
16. Id. at 25.
17. Id. In Tiburon and Fairfield, California, the total impact fees per dwelling
amount to $8,568 and $8,269 respectively. Id.
18. The sample group for this 1985 survey (conducted by Florida State University) was drawn from all cities and counties in the United States. "A sufficient number of communities was randomly selected to ensure an overall level of statistical
confidence of 95% . . . ." Purdum & Frank, Community Use of Exaction: Results of a
National Survey, in DsvELoPMzNT EXACTIoNs 123, 124 (J. Frank & R. Rhodes eds.
1987). Although 41.2% of communities do not require developers to make cash exaction payments, the remaining 58.8% of municipalities require some form of cash ex-
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for this practice concern a lack of land development in the
municipality or county, a recognition that development approval rests with another level of government, and, to a significantly lesser extent, a belief that impact fees are legally
prohibited. 19
There is a reported trend toward increased municipal
adoption of impact fee and in-lieu fee legislation.20 As noted
earlier, communities are reacting to rapid growth by imposing
cash exactions to finance capital facilities. These statistics
may also forecast a similar interest by New York communities
in the adoption of impact fee laws. It will be interesting to
observe the innovative legislative approaches that will inevitably result as additional municipalities enact impact fee
ordinances.2 1
III.

Legal Challenges

A survey of national case law reveals that local impact fee
legislation has been the object of various legal challenges.
These complaints include allegations of inadequate enabling
authority,2" characterization of the fee as an invalid tax,2" and
assertions of takings claims and other constitutional
action. Id. at 137.

19. Id.
20. "Many [governmental] respondents reported a move toward [impact] fees
and in-lieu payments. Future fees were predicted for drainage facilities, transportation, schools, open space, parks, storm sewers, police and fire." Id. at 146.
21. "Santa Monica, California has told developers to go back and refit existing
projects with water-saving toilets. At least one developer has called the measure unconstitutional," but a city council member stated "that developers will not contest
the town's new ordinance because the developers recognize that it is the will of the
community." Schwartz, Hutchinson & Wright, Giving Something Back, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 5,1988, at 35.
22. See, e.g., New Jersey Builders Ass'n v. Bernards Township, 108 N.J. 223, 528
A.2d 555 (1987) (New Jersey Supreme Court invalidates road improvement impact
fee ordinance because the community lacked the necessary enabling authority to enact the ordinance).
See supra note 1 and accompanying text for commentary regarding the legal authority for impact fee enactment by New York communities.
23. See, e.g., Brewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 768 P.2d 765 (1988)
(Idaho Supreme Court invalidates street restoration and maintenance fees as an unauthorized tax); Prisk v. City of Poulsbo, 46 Wash. App. 793, 732 P.2d 1013 (1987)
(invalidating a park fee ordinance as an invalid tax).
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violations.2 4
A.

Characterizationof the Fee as an Invalid Tax

The New York Court of Appeals' decision in Jenad, Inc.
v. Village of Scarsdale 5 considered the "fee versus tax" debate in the context of an in-lieu fee regulation. As previously
discussed, in-lieu fees are generally directed toward assisting a
municipality in purchasing recreational or park land, whereas
impact fees are designed to fund capital improvements of a
broader scope. Nevertheless, the Jenad opinion offers instructive direction to communities contemplating the adoption of
impact fee legislation.
In Jenad, the court reviewed a local regulation imposing
a $250 charge per subdivision lot to be collected by the village
and "'credited to a separate fund to be used for park, playground and recreational purposes ....
,,28 The court deter"
mined that the authority for this type of in-lieu fee was permissibly derived from a state statute. More importantly, the
court recognized that subdivision developments contribute to
the need for increased park land. The close connection between land development and the need for additional municipal recreational properties justified the imposition of the fee
upon the subdivision developer. The court also held that the
payments were not for general governmental purposes and
concluded that "[t]his is not a tax at all but a reasonable form
of village planning for the general community good."27
The court noted approvingly that the payments were
placed in a separate fund and were to be used for a particular
governmental purpose. The segregation of the funds (thereby
avoiding the commingling of payments with general municipal
revenues) was another indication to the court that the in-lieu
24. See, e.g., Warrenville Plaza, Inc. v. Warren Township Sewerage Auth., 230
N.J. Super. 461, 553 A.2d 874 (App. Div. 1989) (upholding sewer connection fee law
despite claim of equal protection violation).
25. 18 N.Y.2d 78, 218 N.E.2d 673, 271 N.Y.S.2d 955.
26. Id. at 82, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
27. Id. at 84, 218 N.E.2d at 676, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 958.
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payment was a valid fee rather than an unauthorized tax.28
New York communities should heed the message of Jenad
when drafting impact fee laws. However, an even more significant challenge to impact fee legislation focuses on claims of
constitutional invalidity.
B.

Constitutional Challenges and the Nollan Nexus

There are a variety of reasons that may dissuade land developers from challenging the validity of impact fee laws. Developers might conclude that a successful challenge will result
in only a Pyrrhic victory because they will encounter a hostile
municipal attitude toward future land development efforts.
Moreover, the inevitable delay associated with litigation may
result in the loss of an attractive loan commitment. A developer may refrain from litigation, realizing that the cost of the
impact fee may ultimately be redistributed to the purchasers
of the developed property.2
Communities enacting impact fee legislation, and those
developers deciding to challenge the constitutional validity of
such laws, should consider the potential relevance of the Supreme Court's Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 0 decision. The Nollan opinion presents the Court's response to
the takings claim of landowners objecting to the imposition of
a land use exaction.
The Nollans sought a permit from the Coastal Commission enabling them to demolish their house and construct a
new one on their land abutting the Pacific Ocean. The Commission granted the permit, but attached a condition requiring the applicants to grant an easement to the public over the
sandy portion of their property. The land was bound' on either
side by the mean high tide line and the Nollan's seawall."1
28. Id. at 83, 218 N.E.2d at 675, 271 N.Y.S.2d at 956.
29. Several commentators have concluded that, in certain real estate markets,
impact fees can be a major factor in increasing housing costs. Delaney & Smith, Development Exactions: Winners and Losers, 41 LAND UsE L. & ZONING DIG. 3 (1989).
See also Katz & Rosen, The InterjurisdictionalEffects of Growth Controls on Housing Prices, 30 J. L. & ECON. 149 (1987).
30. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
31. Id. at 828.
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The Coastal Commission asserted that the new house
would block the ocean view from the highway and contribute
to the expanding development of a "wall of residential structures" between the highway and the ocean.32 The Commission
required the Nollans to grant the easement to provide additional lateral access between the public beaches located to the
north and south of their property.33 Despite protests, a California appellate court sustained the permit condition by
adopting a test tilted in favor of regulatory exactions. The
state court followed the decision in Grupe v. California
Coastal Commissions" when it determined that an exaction
was valid "so long as a project contributed to the need for
public access, even if the project standing alone had not created the need for access, and even if there was only an indirect relationship between the access exacted and the need to
which the project contributed."35
The Nollans appealed to the Supreme Court where they
alleged that the exaction effected a taking of a portion of their
property. An earlier Supreme Court decision held that an impermissible taking occurs if the challenged land use regulation
does not "substantially advance legitimate state interests, or
denies an owner economically viable use of his land."3 6 The
Nollan opinion directed attention to the first prong of this
test 3 7 and determined that a taking had occurred.

The Nollan decision requires a regulatory authority to
determine whether a legitimate police power objective
prompted the authority's regulatory involvement. If so, the
regulatory authority must then determine whether the permit
application should be denied outright (without such denial effecting a taking), since the grant of the permit and the result32. Id.
33. Id. at 829.
34. 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985).
35. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830.
36. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1987) (upholding large lot residential zoning).
37. The Nollans' occupancy of the existing structure located on their ocean front
property precluded a claim that they were denied all economically viable use of land.
Moreover, they sought to retain the same use while occupying a larger structure.
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ing land use activity would substantially impede protection of
the relevant legitimate state interest 3 8
Nollan announces that if a regulatory authority may lawfully deny a landowner's permit application without effecting
a taking, then it is permissible for that authority to grant the
permit and attach a condition designed to address the goal of
the legitimate state interest. s9 The Coastal Commission failed
the latter portion of this test. Although protecting the public's
visual access to the beach may be a valid governmental concern, the exaction that required the Nollans to grant a lateral
easement of public passage over the beach portion of
their
40
property was unrelated to the proffered state interest.
The opinion indicates that a valid land use exaction must
be premised upon a nexus between the subject matter of the
exaction and the legitimate state interest promoted by the relevant land use regulation. The opinion 'does not expand upon
the necessary degree of the relationship or the strength of the
required nexus except to comment that the test adopted by
the Coastal Commission did "not meet even the most un41
tailored standards.'
Some commentators suggest that the Nollan decision is
relevant only when examining exactions that require the physical dedication of land that result in a governmental acquisition of a private property interest. 42 Although Nollan centers
upon a "taking" arising from the imposition of a public easement of passage over private property, many communities and
courts ignore the principles of the decision when considering
the validity of impact fee legislation. The expansive terminology of the majority opinion should deter regulatory bodies
from concluding that the Supreme Court's nexus focus is
38. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-37.
39. Id. at 836-37.
40. Id. at 837. "In short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation
of land use but an 'out-and-out plan of extortion.'" Id. (quoting J.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v.
Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 584, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (1981), overruled sub nom. Town of
Auburn v. McEvoy, 131 N.H. 383, 553 A.2d 317 (1988).
41. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 838.
42. Freilich & Chinn, Finetuningthe Taking Equation: Applying It to Development Exactions, Part II, 40 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. 3, 5 (1988).
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solely directed toward traditional examples of regulatory land
takings. One may concede that the conceptual application of
the Nollan "takings" doctrine to impact fee issues seems uncertain. However, this uncertainty should not be interpreted
to mean that less than a significant nexus will be required
when courts evaluate challenged impact fee legislation.
Respect for the analytical content of Nollan, coupled
with an awareness of its potential application to other forms
of exactions, does not fully compensate for the failure of the
opinion to announce the appropriate nexus test to be applied
when reviewing challenged exactions."3 Attention must be directed to the state judiciary, where courts have traditionally
adopted one of three tests to assess the required nexus between a land use exaction and the permissible goal of state or
local regulation. For example, California courts have repeatedly adopted the relaxed "reasonable relationship" test now
seemingly repudiated by the Nollan decision."
The Illinois judiciary authored a strict formula known as
the "specifically and uniquely attributable" test whereby a
land use exaction will be sustained only if the regulatory body
demonstrates that the exaction imposed upon a developer is
specifically and uniquely attributable to the developer's project. 6 This demanding test virtually denies municipal authority to impose any land use exaction requiring a developer to
contribute money to fund an off-site capital improvement.4 6
43. The decision of the majority to forego adopting a defined "review formula"
prompted the observation that "land use planners .. .[will be] left guessing about
how the Court will react to the next case, and the one after that." Nollan, 483 U.S. at
867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. In Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, the California Supreme Court reasoned that a local law requiring a physical dedication or payment of
an in-lieu fee "can be justified on the basis of a general public need for recreational
facilities caused by present and future subdivisions." 4 Cal. 3d 633, 638, 484 P.2d 606,
610, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630, 634 (1971) (emphasis added). See also Grupe v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 166 Cal. App. 3d 148, 212 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1985) (upholding permit
condition imposing exaction upon ocean-front property).
45. See Pioneer Trust & Say. Bank v. Village of Mount Prospect, 22 Ill.
2d 375,
176 N.E.2d 799 (1961) (invalidating an ordinance requiring the dedication of subdivision land for educational and park use).
46. "By applying the restrictive Pioneer Trust test to development exactions,
courts imposed substantially the same requirements as a special assessment, thus ef-
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The test is overly rigorous and has failed to attract significant
judicial interest.
The most popular standard for validating land use exac47
tions, including impact fees, is the "rational nexus" test.
This test, developed in a Florida opinion, requires that the
imposition of a valid impact fee be dependent upon: a) a development creating a need for the creation or expansion of
certain capital facilities; b) the amount of the fee not exceeding the cost to the municipality in the event that the community provided the facility; and c) the fee being designated to
address the concerns that prompted its imposition.4 8
The New York judiciary applied the "rational nexus" test
in Weingarten v. Town of Lewisboro.4 e The Weingarten litigation concerned the validity of a New York statute and a local planning board regulation that required a payment of
$5,000 in lieu of reservation of park land as a condition of approving a subdivision plat. Plaintiffs asserted that the regulatory structure violated the takings clauses of the federal and
state constitutions.
The Supreme Court of Westchester County reiterated the
familiar Nollan message that "there must be a relationship
between the purpose of the legislation and the methods employed . . . . [Ounce a genuinely valid purpose is established,
a law can restrict the use of property [unless the restriction]
'would interfere so drastically as to constitute a taking.' , 50
The Weingarten opinion recognized that the earlier New York
Court of Appeals' decision in Jenad had upheld the validity of
an in-lieu fee imposition. However, the Weingarten court remarked that the "deferential-reasonable relationship-apfectively precluding their use for most extra-development capital funding purposes."
Camies, Review Essay: Impact Fees, Exactions and Paying for Growth in Hawaii, 11
U. HAw. L. REV. 295, 307 (1989).
47. Stroud, Legal Considerationsof Development Impact Fees, in DEVELOPMENT
IMPACT FEES 83, 84 (A. Nelson ed. 1988).
48. Contractors & Builders Ass'n v. City of Dunedin, 329 So. 2d 314, 317-18 (Fla.
1976).
49. 144 Misc. 2d 849, 542 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (Sup. Ct., Westchester County 1989).
The plaintiff in Weingarten did not challenge the community's authority to enact the
in-lieu fee regulation pursuant to state statutory provisions. See id.
50. Id. at 855, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1016.
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proach of Jenad must give way to the more exacting standard
set forth in Nollan for constitutional review."5 1
The court applied the Nollan rationale by initially concluding that the preservation, maintenance, and development
of park facilities is a legitimate state interest and that-the
plaintiffs' development projects would contribute to the need
for expanding the community's existing recreational facilities.52 The court questioned whether the legislation substantially advanced that interest. It concluded that the required
nexus was present because the legislation expressly provided
for the reservation of park land or, in certain instances, the
payment of a fee to be used for the purchase and development
of parks and recreational areas.53 The court interestingly
noted that the benefits derived from this exaction need not
accrue solely to the plaintiffs' subdivision due to the fact that
the plaintiffs' individual needs could not be isolated from
community-wide needs.54
The Weingarten decision also approved the amount of
the fee imposed upon the landowners. The court reasoned
that the upper limit of the valid park land fee should be measured by the value of the actual subdivision land that the municipality could require the developers to dedicate to the town
for recreational purposes. The $5,000 fee per lot did not exceed the value of such property and was therefore upheld. 5
. The preceding opinions are of extreme relevance to any
New York municipality considering the adoption of an impact
fee ordinance. The Supreme Court, the New York state judiciary, and other appellate tribunals 56 direct that: a) local impact
51. Id. at 857, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1017.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 859, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1018.
55. Id. at 858, 542 N.Y.S.2d at 1017-18..
56. See, e.g., Batch v. Town of Chapel Hill, 92 N.C. App. 601, 376 S.E.2d 22
(1989). In Batch, the plaintiff challenged several bases for local denial of her subdivision application. The North Carolina Court of Appeals reviewed the No~lan opinion'
and concluded that a "heightened scrutiny 'remoteness test' is to be used if a regulation is alleged to violate the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment: the regulation
must 'substantially advance' a 'legitimate state interest.'" Id. at 612, 376 S.E.2d at
29. The North Carolina Court of Appeals also adopted the "rational nexus" exaction
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fee legislation must substantially advance a legitimate state
interest; b) the exacted fee must similarly advance the same
interest; and c) the fee imposed upon the land developer must
also be proportionally related to the impact of the development upon the subject matter of the regulation (e.g., municipal infrastructure). The desired degree of proportionality is
dependent upon the particular "exaction test" adopted by a
court. The Nollan decision, and practical considerations, suggest that the "rational nexus" test is the viable standard if
impact fee laws are to be judicially upheld and applied in a
flexible manner.
IV.

Calculation of an Impact Fee

The preceding discussion of case law is relevant only if it
can be meaningfully applied to the drafting of impact fee legislation. For this reason, the following section illustrates several legislative approaches that encompass the principles of
Nollan and the rational nexus test.
Assume that a community desires to impose an impact
fee upon new development to assist paying for the construction of new public library facilities. Charlotte County, Florida
enacted this form of impact fee in 1986 and a report of that
process is relevant to the present analysis.5
The initial procedure in Charlotte County involved a detest, but after it has been shown that the exaction "substantially advances" a legitimate government interest. Id. at 615, 376 S.E.2d at 31 (emphasis added).
The court combined the reasoning of the Nollan decision, the rationale of the
North Carolina subdivision enabling statute, and the policy underlying the State's
Map Amendment to formulate the following test to "determine whether an exaction
amounts to an unconstitutional taking." Id. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 34. More precisely

stated, a North Carolina trial court should:
(1) identify the condition imposed; (2) identify the regulation which caused
the condition to be imposed; (3) determine whether the regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest. [The court shall then determine]
(4) whether the condition imposed advances that interest; and (5) whether
the condition imposed is proportionally related to the impact of the
development.
Id. at 621, 376 S.E.2d at 34.
57. The Charlotte County Impact Fee calculations are detailed in J. NICHOLAS,
THE CALCULATION OF PROPORTIONATE-SHARE IMPACT FEES 25 (1988) [hereinafter
NICHOLAS].
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termination of the existing level of available library service
based upon the current number of buildings and books. The
community determined that the current provision was 28,195
square feet of building space and 111,400 volumes. Coupled
with a population of 79,000 persons, there was 0.35 square feet
and 1.4 volumes per person.
The Charlotte County Comprehensive Plan indicated
that the existing level of service should be imposed upon new
development. The existing standard in Charlotte County was
consistent with the State of Florida and American Library
standards.
The drafters of the impact fee legislation received information concerning the existing standards in Charlotte County
and were provided with cost data. The county had recently
completed construction of a new library facility containing
7,000 square feet and costing $340,000. This resulted in a cost
of $48.57 per foot. Records also revealed that the county's current acquisition cost was $20.00 per library volume.
Before imposing similar costs upon new development, it
was necessary to determine whether the county's previous library construction and purchase costs had been subsidized.
During the prior ten years, the State of Florida's library
grants program had paid for 9.7% of the county's library
costs. The county's proposed impact fee formula, anticipating
that this subsidy would continue, correspondingly decreased
the fee calculation by this percentage. This decrease is a critical factor in determining a valid impact fee and, if not included, may justifiably cause an aggrieved land developer to
argue that a portion of the required impact fee payment constitutes an invalid tax. More specifically, the developer would
be forced to pay for a cost not incurred by the county.
The county interpreted the preceding information and
determined that the per capita cost of recent library construction was $17.00 ($48.57 x .35). The existing standard of 1.4
volumes per capita at a cost of $20.00 per volume resulted in a
book/volume per capita cost of $28.00. The total cost of these
capita charges was $45.00 ($17.00 plus $28.00). However, this
cost was decreased by the relevant percentage of state subsidy
(9.7%) resulting in a net cost of $40.62 per capita.
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Available statistical information indicated that the average size of a Charlotte County household was 2.23 persons.
Thus, the impact fee per household was $90.58 ($40.62 x 2.23).
The formula properly focused on the cost of the capital improvements and did not include operational or maintenance
costs. These expenses are not a portion of the capital improvements cost and must be borne by the community rather
than imposed upon individual property owners. The Charlotte
County Library Impact Fee Ordinance represents a relatively
straight forward legislative effort, and a similar fact-gathering
approach could be adopted when drafting road, park, sewer,
water, or other impact fee laws.
The drafting of impact fee legislation becomes more detailed if a regulatory body, unlike Charlotte County, desires to
increase the existing public facility standards. For example,
assume that a community is aware of the current amount of
public park land per resident and desires to increase the existing standard. The existing deficiency cannot be incorporated within the impact fee formula. The community must address and satisfy the differential between the existing and
desired park land standards. 8 New development is validly
subject to an impact fee based upon the new standard so long
as the impact fees are not directed toward rectifying existing
deficiencies and the community has undertaken efforts to
remedy the deficit.
Legislators must also be aware of the relevance of "past
contributions" when drafting impact fee legislation.59 Owners
of undeveloped land are required to pay property taxes and
past property tax payments have likely been used by the municipality to satisfy the cost of capital improvements. As an
example, a community contemplating the adoption of a road
impact fee ordinance should determine the amount of property taxes derived from undeveloped land and the extent to
which property taxes have been used to satisfy road construction expenses. Owners of undeveloped land will likely assert
58. Nicholas & Nelson, The Rational Nexus Test and Appropriate Development

Impact Fees, in

DEVELOPMENT IMPAcT

FEEs 172 (A. Nelson ed. 1988).

59. Id. at 174.
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that their past tax contributions assisted the community in
constructing new roads, however, their undeveloped land did
not generate any vehicles traveling on the roadways. Consequently, the owner of the undeveloped property did not receive any benefit from the past tax payments and the developer will maintain that the impact fee formula should offer a
credit to reflect this fact.60 This is a legitimate suggestion and
one commentator has observed that "common sense should be
relied upon to determine whether new development has paid
for various services and facilities and whether any benefit was
derived."6' 1
The discussion of library and road impact fee legislation
illustrates the application of the rational nexus test. The test
requires that a regulatory body equalize the burden of new
development upon existing development while avoiding any
subsidy of the existing development by the new development.
This sentiment is reflected in Banberry v. South Jordan City
wherein a probing analysis of impact fee calculation is
62
offered.
In Banberry, the Utah Supreme Court set forth various
factors to guide a regulatory body when determining the legitimate proportion of capital improvement costs to be borne by
new development via impact fee payments. These factors include an awareness of the cost of existing capital facilities, the
method previously adopted to finance existing capital improvements, and any past contributions by new development
to fund existing capital improvements. s This analytical ap60. In Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376, 379 (Utah 1982), the Utah Supreme
Court stresses the need to analyze the method adopted to finance existing facilities in
order "to assure that a property owner involved in a new home development is not
required to buy into the capital value of existing municipal services and then pay for
:. . the same capital value a second time by future tax payments against the bonded

indebtedness used to construct them originally." Id.; See Downey v. Wells Sanitary
Dist., 561 A.2d 174, 176 (Me. 1989) (upholding sewer impact fee legislation offering a
credit to property owners for earlier monetary contributions to existing facilities).
61. NICHOLAS, supra note 57, at 13.
62. 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981) (establishing standards for determining the reasonableness of water connection and park improvement fees).
63. Id. at 903-05. The Banberry court also required investigation of the degree to
which new development: will pay for existing capital improvements by future debt
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proach will likely lead to municipal compliance with the rational nexus test as well as the dictates of the Nollan decision
and thereby result in the enactment of valid impact fee
formulae.
V.

Conclusion

Municipal interest in impact fee legislation is understandable, and a model impact fee ordinance represents an adroit
blending of legal, political, and practical considerations. The
preceding commentary set forth several of the attendant legal
concerns with the hope of alerting interested parties to the
potential strengths and weaknesses of such legislation.
Enactment of equitable impact fee laws in New York
seems largely dependent upon communities approaching the
topic with an awareness of the proper nexus that must exist
between the fee and the impact of new development upon relevant public facilities. New York municipalities will undoubtedly be well served by impact fee laws adhering to this
standard.

service payments, will be required to construct capital improvements or dedicate land
for such improvements, and will require extraordinary municipal infrastructure costs.
Id.
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